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NEW YORK STATE'S OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR: A CREATION BORN OF
NECESSITY
Maurice H. Nadjari*
ON September 19, 1972, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of
New York, acting pursuant to state constitutional' and statutory 2
authority, issued a series of Executive Orders 3 which directed the
State's Attorney General to:4
*

.

. attend in person, or by one or more of [his] assistants or

deputies, an Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the
Supreme Court ...

to be held in and for [each of the counties

comprising part of the City of New York] ...
for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting past, present,
and future corruption relating to or in any way connected with
the enforcement of law and administration of criminal justice in
the City of New York.
What the Governor had done, in fact, was to direct the Attorney General to appoint a Special Prosecutor, as a Special Deputy
Attorney General, and to create the Office of the Special State
Prosecutor. Moreover, the Governor took the extraordinary step
of giving the Attorney General power superseding those which
New York City's five district attorneys have within their respective counties as to the specific subject matter jurisdiction encompassed within the Orders.'
* B.B.A. The City College of New York, 1947, J.D. New York University 1950; Special
Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Special State Prosecutor, New York State. The
author formerly was General Counsel to the State Study Commission for New York City
and Chief Assistant District Attorney for Suffolk County.
1. N.Y. CONsT. art. IV § 3. This section imposes on the Governor a constitutional
obligation to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed."
2. N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 63(2), 63(8) (McKinney 1972).
3. Executive Orders Nos. 55 (New York Co.), 56 (Bronx Co.), 57 (Queens Co.), 58
(Kings Co.), 59 (Richmond Co.) 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § § 1.55-.59 (1972) (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Executive Orders). The orders are identical except for reference to a
specific county. Order No. 55 as amended is reproduced in Appendix A.
4. Id., para. I.
5. Normally, pursuant to provisions of N.Y. CoUNTY LAw § 700(1), (McKinney 1972),
prosecution of crimes cognizable by the courts of a county is vested exclusively in the
elected district attorney of the county, while prosecution by the Attorney General is
limited only to those few situations where statutory provisions specifically grant power to
the Attorney General. The Governor's action pursuant to N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 63(2)
(McKinney 1972) in granting broader prosecutorial power to the Attorney General, and
of stripping the county district attorneys of prosecutorial jurisdiction by superseding his
powers is therefore extraordinary.
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In yet another series of Executive Orders, the Governor appointed an Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the State
Supreme Court in and for each of New York City's five counties.'
The Governor specified that the Extraordinary Terms were to
continue for as long as was necessary so that the Attorney General
could continue to bring action in accordance with his earlier orders. Governor Rockefeller then designated the Honorable John
M. Murtagh 7 to hold the Extraordinary Special and Trial Terms
in each of New York City's counties.
In the'Executive Orders of September 19, 1972, however, the
Governor gave the Special Deputy Attorney General power far
more extensive than those ordinarily possessed by a prosecutor.
Paragraph I of the Executive Orders vests in him prosecutorial
powers, while paragraph II grants him broad commission powers.
In paragraph II the Governor, pursuant to Section 63(8) of the
Executive Law, found it in the public interest to require the Attorney General to "inquire into matters concerning the public
peace, public safety and public justice with respect to" corruption insofar as it relates in any way to law enforcement or criminal
justice administration in New York City.' This provision of the
Executive Law grants the Attorney General's office subpoena
powers, permits the holding of hearings, and mandates that upon
request, all public officers and employees give him "all information and assistance in their possession and within their power" in
connection with his inquiries.'
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Governor's Executive
Orders to the Attorney General is, at once, both broad and specific. The broader grant of jurisdiction covers:
(a) any and all corrupt acts and omissions by a public
servant or former public servant occurring heretofore or hereafter in the [City] of New York in violation of any provision of
6. Executive Orders Nos. 61 (New York Co.), 62 (Bronx Co.), 63 (Queens Co.), 64
(Kings Co.), 65 (Richmond Co.) 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 1.61-.65 (1972). The orders are identical
except for references to a specific county. For constitutional and statutory authority upon
which this series of orders is based see N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 27 and N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 149 (McKinney 1968). Executive Order No. 61 is reproduced in Appendix B infra.
7. Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial District.
8. See Executive Orders, supra note 3, and Appendix A, infra.
9. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(8) (McKinney 1972). This section permits the Governor to
direct the Attorney General to inquire into matters concerning the public peace, public
safety, and public justice. The Attorney General or his deputies are given broad investigatory powers by the statutory provision, subject to the check that detailed weekly reports
be made to the Attorney General and the Governor.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/3

2

Nadjari: New York State's Office of the Special Prosecutor: A Creation Bor

New York's Special Prosecutor
State or local law and arising out of, relating to or in any way
connected with the enforcement of law or administration of
criminal justice in the City of New York;
(b) any and all acts and omissions and alleged acts and
omissions by any person occurring heretofore or hereafter in the
[City] of New York in violation of any provision of State or
local law and arising out of, relating to or in any way connected
with corrupt acts or omissions by a public servant or former
public servant arising out of, relating to, or in any way connected with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in the City of New York;
(d) any and all acts and omissions and alleged acts and
omissions occurring heretofore or hereafter to obstruct, hinder
or interfere with any inquiry, prosecution, trial or judgment
10

In defining "corrupt acts and omissions," the orders contain
greater specificity: "unauthorized exercise of official functions;""
failure to perform duties imposed by law, rules or regulations or
duties inherent in the nature of the office;' 2 acts constituting
violations of Penal Law' 3 provisions which define the crimes of
coercion,' 4 larceny,' 5 official misconduct,' 6 obstructing governmental administration,' 7 bribery involving public servants and
related offenses,' 8 perjury and related offenses,' 9 other offenses
relating to judicial and other proceedings, 20 criminal solicitation,2'
conspiracy, 22 attempt,2s and criminal facilitation 24 with respect to
the substantive crimes, and any and all offenses that may be
25
properly joined with these criminal violations.
The temporal jurisdiction of both series of Executive Or10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Executive Orders, supra note 3, paras. I (a), I (b), I (d); see Appendix A infra.
Id. para. I (c)(1).
Id. para. III (c)(2).
Id.para. HI (c)(3).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60, 135.65 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 155 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.05 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 200 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAv art. 210 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 215 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 100 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 105 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 110 (McKinney 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 115 (McKinney 1967).
Executive Orders, para. 111 (5), supra note 3, and Appendix A infra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 3

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

ders, 21 is extensive. Except where no pre-order indictments had
been filed, and regardless of whether or not an investigation had
been commenced either prior or subsequent to the original dates
of the Executive Orders, the Attorney General's new prosecutorial
powers extend to all acts or omissions alleged to have occurred
both before and after that dateY Moreover, since the Governor's
Executive Orders contain no expiration date, both the Special
Prosecutor's jurisdiction and the Extraordinary Terms' lives are
without specified limit as to duration. Thus, both the Special
Prosecutor's Office and the Extraordinary Terms have continuous, temporal jurisdiction until terminated by some future gubernatorial orders, or ideally, until they have become self-expiring
by eliminating all corruption and allegations or suspicion of corruption involving New York City's criminal justice system.
New York's Executive Law does not mandate that the Governor state his reasons for requiring the Attorney General to act in
criminal proceedings wherein a district attorney's authority is to
be superseded. 28 Nor is he required to do so when directing the
Attorney General to conduct an inquiry. 2 However, in the exercise of gubernatorial discretion to assure faithful execution of the
laws, there may be a requirement that there be some "reasonable
relationship between the action taken by the Governor, through
the Attorney General, and the proper discharge of the executive
function." 30 Thus, in his Executive Orders of September 19, 1972
the Governor referred to the recommendation of the Commission
to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption in the City of New
York, popularly known as the Knapp Commission.
The Knapp Commission cited various factors which justified
its recommendation that a Special State Prosecutor be appointed: the immediate need to supplement the agencies charged
with combatting police corruption, the basic weakness in existing
approaches to police corruption in their primary reliance on policemen to do investigative work, a general public distrust of the
system for dealing with complaints against police, accusations of
26. See notes 3 to 6 supra and accompanying text.
27. Executive Orders, paras. I, IV, supra note 3, and Appendix A infra.
28. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 1972).
29. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(8) (McKinney 1972).
30. Matter of DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 216, 101 N.E.2d 464, 469 (1951). The case
involved a challenge of a gubernatorial ordbr pursuant to now N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(8)
(McKinney 1972), requesting the Attorney General as part of the New York State Crime
Commission to hold an inquiry concerning "public peace, public safety and public justice"
and to investigate the relationship between organized crime and government.
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corruption among prosecutors, lawyers, and judges, the need for
a public demonstration that society is committed to a war on
corruption, the jurisdictional inadequacies of a city agency, and
the correlative necessity for city-wide jurisdiction, the need for
independence, and the need for immediate action.
In making its recommendation the Knapp Commission
32
stated:
To meet these needs, we recommend that the Governor, acting
with the Attorney General pursuant to § 63 of the Executive
Law, appoint a Special Deputy Attorney General with jurisdiction in the five counties of the City and authority to investigate
and prosecute all crimes involving corruption in the criminal
process.
The powers of such Deputy Attorney Generals are traditional
and well established. They include the power to use the grand
jury and employ all investigative techniques incident to grand
jury proceedings. They also include the power to suggest grand
jury presentments and make other public reports.
The proposed SpecialDeputy Attorney Generalshould use these
powers to the widest extent.
In a press release issued at the same time as the Executive
Orders calling for a Special State Prosecutor, the Governor emphasized, however, that he was not relying solely on the Knapp
Commission's findings and recommendations. He stated that his
action was taken in response to the Knapp Commission's findings, fortified by the disclosures and recommendations of many
others including the Mayor of New York City, the Chairman of
the Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, the Chairman of the
State Commission of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. 3 That
the Governor thus had a sufficient basis for the discretionary
exercise of executive power is unquestionable. Indeed, this combination of supportive disclosures and recommendations from law
enforcement agencies and officers encouraged the Governor in
31. See COAMSSIoN TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION IN THE CTY
OF NEW YORK, SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS, 13-16 (August, 1972).

32. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
33. Statement by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Special Prosecutor/N.Y.C.)
(Sept. 19, 1972); Transcript of Press Conference of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller held
at the Gotham Hotel, New York, N.Y. (Sept. 19, 1972).
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issuing his Executive Orders to reach the following conclusion: 34
I have taken this action in recognition of a fundamental reality:
that under the present circumstances, only an independent
agency with city-wide authority, assigned a clear and specific
mission and armed with full prosecuting power and independent
investigative capacity, can break through the natural resistance
of government agencies to investigate themselves or their close
allies, can overcome the forces of inertia, and can finally deal a
decisive blow to narcotics, crime and corruption in New York
City.
By his actions and statements, the Governor recognized and
accepted as fact reports that existing agencies and means to investigate and prosecute corruption in New York City's criminal
justice system, as well as those responsible for ensuring the integrity of that system, whether by structure or operation, were patently inadequate for the necessary public confidence and trust in
that system. The Governor further emphasized the seriousness of
the situation as a matter of state concern because of its symbolic
impact on other aspects of government: ". . . if we have corruption in the criminal justice process, how are we going to stamp
out corruption anywhere in government . . . [?] We're going
right to the heart of the problem . . ."
Such fundamental questioning of the efficacy of existing
structures and means to deal with problems of corruption within
the criminal justice system requires both an overview of the problem and a specific examination of the adequacy of means to examine, investigate, and take appropriate action with respect to
judges, district attorneys, lawyers in private practice, and law
enforcement officers.
I.

OFFICIAL CORRUPTION: THE INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS

Today, corruption in government and in law enforcement
has, on a national scale, become a public scandal of both awesome and chilling proportions. Corruption problems have afflicted, to a greater or lesser extent, all levels of government and
all aspects of the criminal justice system across the country. As
if this corruption per se were not sufficiently troublesome, it may
34. Statement by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Special Prosecutor/N.Y.C.), supra
note 33 at 2.
35. Transcript of Press Conference, supra note 33 at 8-9.
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be even more problematic to the ordinary citizen than would
appear from a surface view. It is too well established to have to
again document that this corruption is necessary for organized
crime to flourish.36
New York State has been plagued by its share of corruption
in law enforcement and government. Corruption has been exposed in such diverse places as New York City, Albany, Buffalo,
Newburgh, and Suffolk County.3 7 Moreover, it is universally
agreed that the degree of corruption uncovered is only a small
portion of the criminal activities which actually exist. But how
does New York usually attempt to deal with this problem?
Traditionally, in this State, the corruption problem has been
strictly within the province of the local county prosecutor. This
approach has meant that local prosecutors deal with individual
corruption problems on a case by case basis as they arise. On
occasion, a Special Prosecutor might be appointed for limited
investigation to deal with specific problems,38 but this too has
meant a piecemeal approach without any long-range, comprehensive strategy to attack the corruption problem on a statewide or
multi-jurisdictional basis. There simply has never been a wellplanned, broad based, continuing attempt to meet the corruption
problem throughout New York.
The practice of leaving the corruption problem to locally
elected county prosecutors has revealed a number of serious defects in current methods, the most basic of which has been the
lack of commitment and effort on the part of local officials to
aggressively investigate official corruption. This situation may
have several explanations.
With ever expanding criminal case loads, local county prosecutors lack the resources to adequately investigate and prosecute
their political superiors and associates. Assistant district attorneys, whose appointment or discharge are in the personal discre36. See PRESIDENr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus'TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIm at 191 (Feb., 1967).
37. See COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRuPTION IN THE CITY

OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT, (1972); Buffalo, THID ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1961); Syracuse, THmD AND
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORTS, (1961, 1963). Indictments have recently been tried in Suffolk
County and Newburgh, New York. The Albany Police Department is now being investigated by the Temporary Commission of Investigation.
38. See, e.g., 1938 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 301; 1926 Public Papers of
Governor Smith 266. See also, In re Turecamo Contracting Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 21
N.Y.S. 2d 270 (2d Dep't 1940).
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tion of the district attorney, without required reference to any
merit system or fixed standards and often subject to political
influence, are unlikely to actively pursue investigations and prosecutions of the very same people who may be able to influence or
control their career progress.
Other defects in the current system include the fact that
while the corruption problem is not restricted by county boundaries, the geographic jurisdiction of the local district attorney is so
delimited. The reliance of the local prosecutor on police to conduct the field investigations of all his cases, together with the
resulting practical difficulties involved in investigating the police
and judges upon whom he depends and with whom he works,
throttles the local prosecutor's investigatory and prosecutorial
efforts. All of these defects apply to some extent to the major
structure and means existing in New York State for attacking
corruption both within the criminal justice system and in government, i.e., investigation and prosecution within his county by a
locally elected district attorney.
New York State also provides several other structures and
methods for receiving complaints, investigating, and taking action with respect to corruption by those involved in the criminal
justice processes. In trying to determine whether there exists a
long-term necessity for a Special Prosecutor with broad geographic jurisdiction to handle corruption problems, it is important to examine the alternate means now provided under New
York State law for attacking official corruption by those responsible for investigating, deterring, prosecuting and punishing
criminal behavior.
A.

Judicial Corruption

The New York State Constitution and statutes provide, as a
supplement to ordinary criminal proceedings, several methods of
removal as a disciplinary measure in order to deal with problems
of corruption and abuse of judicial office. 9 Each carries its own
procedural variations as to investigation, specification, presentation, and trial of charges. Removal methods include:
39. See Note, Remedies for JudicialMisconduct and Disability:Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 149 (1966); TEMPORARy STATE COMMISSION ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, THE JUDICIARY 41-57 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TEMPORARY
STATE COMMISSION, THE JuDIcIARY]. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REMOVAL OF JUDoES
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1. Impeachment by the legislature."
2. Legislative Removal Proceedings by concurrent resolutions (for Judges of the Court of Appeals and Justices of the
Supreme Court).4
3. Legislative Removal Proceedings by the Senate after
gubernatorial recommendation (for Judges of other constitutional
courts including, but not limited to the County Court, Criminal
Court of the City of New York, and District Court and such other
inferior courts as the legislature may determine).42
4. Removal by the Court on the Judiciary.43
40. N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 24. An absolute majority of the Assembly has the power
to vote formal impeachment charges. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments consists
of the President of the Senate, all or a majority of the Senators, and all or a majority of
the judges of the Court of Appeals. Members of the Court take an oath to try the impeachment according to the evidence, and conviction requires the concurrence of two-thirds of
the members present. Judgment may extend no further than removal or removal and
disqualification, but the party impeached remains susceptible to indictment and punishment according to law. The constitution does not define or specify grounds for removal
by impeachment. Presumably, whether the grounds are sufficient for impeachment may
be determined for each case as part of the impeachment proceedings.
It is to be noted that acquittal on impeachment does not prevent criminal conviction
on bribery. See People v. Stillwell, 81 Misc. 456, 142 N.Y.S. 628 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
41. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI § 23(a), (c). Removal may be accomplished by concurrent
resolution of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all members elected to each
house concur therein. Removal must be for cause. The judge or justice must be served with
a statement of the cause alleged, and must have had an opportunity to be heard.
"Cause" is not defined by the Constitution, but has been construed in several cases
involving the removal of judicial officers. See Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 528, 249
N.E.2d 369, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 484, 493 - 495 (1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 317, (1969);
Matter of Osterman, 13 N.Y. 2d (a), (p) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1963); Sarisohn v. App.
Div., 2d Dept., Sup. Ct. of St. of N.Y., 265 F. Supp. 455, 458 (E.D. N.Y. 1967); Matter of
Kane v. Rudich, 256 App. Div. 586, 587, 10 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (2d Dep't 1939).
42. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (b), (c). Removal may be accomplished by an absolute
two-thirds concurrence of members of the Senate after recommendation of the Governor.
Removal must be on cause. The judge or justice must be served with a statement of the
cause alleged, and must have had an opportunity to be heard.
43. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a-h). This constitutional provision establishes the
Court on the Judiciary composed of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the Senior
Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, and one Justice of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of each judicial department. The Court on the Judiciary, upon affirmative
concurrence of not less than four members of the court, has the power to remove for cause
and disqualify from public office judges of constitutional courts after due notice and
hearing.
The Court on the Judiciary may be convened by the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals on his own motion, and must be convened by the Chief Judge on written request
by the Governor or by a Presiding Justice of an Appellate Division or by a majority of the
Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association. After the Court on the
Judiciary has been convened and removal charges preferred, but before a hearing commences, written notice must be given to the Governor and legislature. The Court on the
Judiciary then may be superseded by commencement of impeachment proceedings.
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5. Removal by the Appellate Division.4
In addition, the constitution and state laws which create the
Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference grant the Board
significant powers, and charge it with responsibility for the administrative supervision of the courts." These supervisory powers
allow the Administrative Board to investigate complaints against
judges and about the administration of justice.
Even in combination, however, these multiple powers and
structures appear to be of limited utility as the means to investigate, try, and punish judicial corruption. The legislative powers
of judicial removal have been used only twice, once by impeachment and once by Senate removal on recommendation of the
Governor. Neither instance occurred in this century. The power
of removal by joint legislative resolution has never been used. In
general, legislative removal proceedings may be considered an
inadequate answer to the judicial discipline problem because
they are "cumbersome, often political, with no right of appeal."4
The Court on the Judiciary is given power to designate attorneys to act as counsel to
conduct the proceedings, summon witnesses, and use subpoena power for purposes of
investigation and trial. The Court has power to make its own rules and procedures for
investigation and trial.
44. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 429 (McKinney Supp. 1972). A judge of the courts for the
City of New York, and of specified other inferior courts may be removed for cause as
provided by the Constitution, and be disqualified from holding future office by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division may order proofs upon any
proceedings under the provision, to be taken before a referee appointed by the court. The
Appellate Division is also granted power on its own motion or on petition, to investigate
or cause to be investigated, the inferior courts and their judges, and to designate a Justice
of the Supreme Court or to appoint a referee to conduct such investigations.
This section of the Judiciary Law is a statutory enactment of the powers of removal
and retirement after due notice and hearing granted to the Appellate Divisions by N.Y.
CONsT. art. VI, § 22 (i).

45. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28. This section provides for the Administrative Board of
the Judicial Conference, comprised of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, as chairman, and the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Divisions, with the authority and responsibility for the administrative supervision of the unified court system. The N.Y. JUDICMRY
LAW, § 212(6) (McKinney 1968) specifies one function of the Administrative Board to be:
"The examination of the operation of the courts and the state of their dockets, investigation of criticisms, complaints and recommendations with regard to the administration of
justice in such court system and the disposition of such complaints, criticisms and recommendations." By § 213(4) of the N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW (McKinney 1968) the Administrative
Board is also given power to hold hearings and conduct investigations, and in conjunction
therewith, subpoena power is granted.
46. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, THm JUDICIARY, supra note 39 at 45; Cannon,
The New York Court on the Judiciary, 1948 to 1963, 28 Albany L. Rev. 1 at 2 n.6 (1964).
47. See COMMITTEE ON STATE COURTS OF SUPERIOR JuRusDIroN, Removal of Judges
for Disabilityand Misconduct, in Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK, supra note
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In addition, procedures for legislative removal do not provide
means for any self-initiated or on-going system of receipt or investigation of complaints or charges against members of the bench.
Moreover, the limitations of impeachment to removal and disqualification, with reservation of liability to indictment and punishment according to law,4" might well create a situation where
following either a successful or unsuccessful attempt at impeachment, the People's case in any future proceedings might be so
disclosed as to make obtaining a criminal conviction exceedingly
difficult.
Indeed, the nature of the legislature itself is inherently incompatible with the exercise of its removal powers. It is a policy
making rather than an adjudicative body. Its very size makes it
ill-suited for the orderly conduct of trials. Furthermore, many of
its members are not lawyers, but rather men with other interests
more easily subjected to partisan considerations than to the performance of a neutral judicial role.
The Court on the Judiciary procedure has been used on six
occasions since its creation in 1948: Twice, judges have been removed.4 9 In one instance two judges were "rebuked and reprimanded" but not removed,50 and, on two convenings, the proceedings were closed as moot because of the accused judge's formal resignation and representation amounting to future disqualifications.5"
The Court on the Judiciary is convened only on an ad hoc
basis. It has neither continuous existence nor a permanent staff,
and it makes its own rules of procedure.12 True, the Court may
perform its function well once a particular case has caused it to
be convened. Its structure, however, hinders the Court in two
important areas: First, it cannot be an effective watchdog over
judicial conduct. Second, it cannot investigate all complaints
concerning judicial misconduct.
39 at i-ii; See Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and
Disciplineof Judges, supra note 39 at 163.
48. See note 40 supra.

49. Matter of Friedman, 12 N.Y. 2d (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1963); Matter of Osterman, 13 N.Y. 2d(a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1963).

50. Matter of Sobel (Liebowitz), 8 N.Y. 2d(a) (Ct. on the Judiciary, 1960).
51. Matter of Schweitzer, 29 N.Y. 2d (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1972); Matter of
Michael M. D'Auria, Ct. on the Judiciary convened April 2, 1971, proceedings mooted by
resignation July 28, 1971 (unreported). The Court on the Judiciary was last convened April
12, 1973, in Matter of Joseph J. Pfingst, which remains sub judice (unreported).
52. See Matter of Schweitzer, 29 N.Y. 2d (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1972).
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Criticism has been leveled at the procedures of the Court on
the Judiciary for several reasons: Once the Court is convened, the
matter under consideration becomes public. This situation makes
confidential investigation difficult and creates adverse publicity
for its subject, who may then suffer possibly premature public
censure. The Court also has been questioned because it performs
both prosecutorial and judicial functions, thus making it difficult
for it to insure its own impartiality. Other criticisms rest on the
grounds that there is no appeal from the Court's decision, that
the members of the Court, because they are all elected officials,
may be subject to partisan pressures, and that the powers of the
Court may be superseded by the legislature on the basis of political considerations?3
The Appellate Divisions' powers to remove judges or hear
cases involving charges against judges have been the judicial discipline procedures most often used. On at least twenty-three occasions, the Appellate Divisions have held hearings which have
resulted in at least five removals of judges and six condemnations
or reprimands. 4 On receipt of a complaint or on its own motion,
the Appellate Division either may take action by appointing a
referee to take evidence, by conducting an investigation itself, or
by appointing a justice of the Supreme Court or a referee to
conduct an investigation of inferior courts or judges." The Appellate Division, after a hearing, may then confirm, modify or reject
any report it receives.
As in the Court on the Judiciary situation, the Appellate
Division may be criticized on the grounds that it may be performing both prosecutorial and judicial functions in connection with
its removal powers and that, since all of the judges are elected
officials, they may be subjected to extra-judicial pressures. The
Appellate Divisions also lack sufficient resources to be effective
anti-corruption instrumentalities. While the Presiding Justice of
an Appellate Division" may himself investigate complaints made
against judges, or assign complaints for investigation to the Court
53. See generally note 39 supra. The fact that the decision of the Court on the
Judiciary is not appealable does not necessarily mean that it cannot be attacked in a
collateral proceeding. Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y. 2d 528, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 397 U.S. 317 (1970).
54. See Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Disci.
pline of Judges, supra note 39 at 186-187; see, e.g., In re Sarisohn, 29 A.D. 2d 91, 286
N.Y.S. 2d 336 (2nd Dep't. 1967) aff'd., 22 N.Y. 2d 808, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 907 (1968).
55. See N.Y. JuDIcAY LAW § 429 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
56. See N.Y. JuDnCLARY LAW §§ 71, 85 (McKinney 1968).
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Administrator17 or the Administrative Judge of the Department,",
the Appellate Divisions have neither permanent staffs nor fixed
procedures for the investigation of these complaints.
Two other formal judicial structures exist within the State of
New York for dealing with problems of judicial corruption or
misconduct. The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, comprised of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and
the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Divisions, is vested by the
New York State Constitution with the authority and responsibility for administrative supervision of the court system. 9 The Administrative Board's functions in discharge of its constitutional
duty encompass broad investigatory powers, including:"0
The examination of the operation of the courts and the state of
their dockets, investigation of criticisms, complaints and recommendations with regard to the administration of justice in such
court system and the disposition of such complaints, criticisms
and recommendation.
In performing this function the Board is granted specific
power to "hold hearings and conduct investigations,"" as well as
the necessary subpoena power for its effectuation. 2 In addition,
the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, itself, is
granted certain powers and responsibilities including that of advising and assisting the Administrative Board.6 3
The existence of these two structures, even with their broad
statewide powers of investigation, however, does little to correct
the weaknesses in New York State's overall system of dealing
with problems of judicial corruption and misconduct. The Administrative Board lacks continuous existence and a permanent
investigatory staff. Though the power exists to investigate complaints and hold hearings, the lack of a permanent mechanism or
staff compromises whatever usefulness the Board might have in
systemmatically and confidentially investigating and dealing
with complaints.
57. See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 215 (McKinney 1968).
58. See N.Y. JuDIclRy LAW § 217 (McKinney 1968).
59. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28. See N.Y. JuDiCARy LAW § 210-213 (McKinney 1968).
60. N.Y. JuDIciARY LAW § 212(6) (McKinney 1968).
61. N.Y. JuDICIARy LAW § 213(4) (McKinney 1968).
62. Id.
63. N.Y. JuDIcIARY LAW §§ 224-229, (McKinney 1968). It should be noted that it was
a resolution of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York which led the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals to convene the Court on the Judiciary in Matter of Sobel (Leibowitz), 8 N.Y. 2d (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1960).
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Another potential problem is that participation of the Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals in the Administrative Board's investigation of complaints may require his disqualification in particular cases referred by the Board to the Court on the Judiciary.
These factors have led the authors of a leading study on remedies
for judicial misconduct to conclude that although the Administrative Board may be well suited for the more serious case, "...
it is unlikely that the board could'expand its operations in the
discipline and disability area.""
Of course, any judge suspected of engaging in any criminal
conduct may be the subject of criminal investigation and prosecution by a grand jury or district attorney of the county in which
such conduct is alleged to have occurred.65 If the alleged acts are
corrupt within the meaning of the Governor's Executive Orders,"0
and are alleged to have occurred within New York City, the Special State Prosecutor may then exercise his powers. Under certain
circumstances, and if related to organized crime activities, the
Deputy Attorney General in charge of the sfatewide Organized
Crime Task Force" may also play an important investigatory and
prosecutorial role.
Nevertheless, as the primary prosecutorial responsibility
would normally rest with a local district attorney, there exist
grave doubts as to the efficacy of this safeguard. 8 A district attorney must maintain close working relationships with local judges
who will try the criminal prosecutions he brings, and these relationships may be seriously jeopardized if his investigations of
judges, or of a particular judge, become publicly known. It should
be reiterated that because the district attorney is a locally elected
official, as are the judges, he may be influenced by extra-legal
considerations when undertaking investigation of judges' conduct.
In summary, New York State's system of dealing with judicial corruption and misconduct has some serious faults. The existing structures for judicial removal, putting aside the inherent
inadequacies of the legislative impeachment process, do leave a
64. Note, Remedies for JudicialMisconduct and Disability:Removal and Discipline
of Judges, supra note 39 at 190.
65. N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 700 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. CRmo. PRo. LAW § 190.55 et seq.
(McKinney 1971).
66. Executive Orders, supra, note 3, and Appendix A infra.
67. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 70-a (McKinney 1972).
68. See discussion supra, Section I.
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void requiring a more permanent structure to investigate and
prosecute complaints of judicial misconduct and corruption. The
void might well be filled by a permanent Office of the Special
State Prosecutor which would be empowered with statewide jurisdiction. Indeed, the current judicial remedies suffer with certain
weaknesses because of the non-existence of any permanent structural mechanism or professional staff for dealing with the problems of corruption.
This lack of any permanent, fixed structure for confidentially
handling complaints concerning judges means that complaints
may proceed through the system or get lost in a variety of ways,
that there is no staff capable of conducting an on-going investigation over a period of time, that there are no self-initiated investigations but only responses to specific complaints, that ad hoc
staff appointed for particular cases do not necessarily have sufficient prosecutorial skills or background, that complainants may
not come forward because of their fear of reprisals without guarantees of confidentiality, and, that the aggrieved may not know
with any degree of certainty where to go with their complaints.
An institutionalized mechanism, the existence and availability of
which would be known to the public, and which would remedy
these problems is sorely needed.
Finally, the structures themselves are subject to more fundamental criticisms in three areas: jurisdiction, public confidence,
and politics.
First, the jurisdiction of judicial mechanisms for investigating and removing judges is limited only to examining and investigating the judges whose conduct or activities have been called
into question. What is lacking is authority either to commence an
investigation without first having received a complaint or proceeding against corruptors in ways other than those provided for
under the Appellate Division's statutory powers over attorneys."
If existing mechanisms are to be truly effective and if their actions are to have a deterrent impact, they must have that author-.

ity. 70

Second, the efficacy of judicial mechanisms and remedies
may be questioned because they allow judges to investigate and
69. See N.Y. JUDICIARY

LAW § 90 (McKinney 1968).
70. See COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION IN THE CrrY

(August, 1972). The jurisdiction of judicial mechanisms must be broadened to allow them to take action against those
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who try to influence judges as well as against the judges improperly influenced.
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judge other judges without examination by or appeal to outside
agencies. Existing structures and procedures vest the judiciary
with investigatory, prosecutory, adjudicatory, and appellate review powers when it comes to dealing with judges. This apparent
insulation from outside, non-judicial agencies in policing judges
may create problems of public confidence requiring some new
method of examining complaints against judges," especially at a
time when allegations against members of the bench are rife.72
A persuasive argument might also be made that because of
fraternal empathy, judges may not diligently pursue allegations
against their brethren. This is so not only because judges wish not
to offend their colleagues, but also because of the fear that such
investigation and prosecution would bring the bench into disrepute.
The last area of criticism of existing judicial remedies is that
they may not be free of political influence since the judges of the
Court of Appeals and the justices of the Supreme Court are
elected officials.7 3 The mere fact that New York State's judges are
elected can be subject to censure, especially since existing means
of candidate selection woefully lack sufficient mechanisms for
screening and scrutinizing nominees. A weakness such as this
permits exertion of considerable control by local party officials.
Some have found this system of judicial selection itself to be a
significant institutional defect in the New York system of judicial
discipline: "[Tihe officials involved are subject to political pressures, and although their personal integrity may enable them to
resist such pressure, the system itself cannot insulate them be' 7'
cause they are elected.
B.

Corruptionin DistrictAttorney's Offices
The district attorney is an elected county law enforcement
official whose office is mandated in the New York State Constitution. 75 The functions,duties, and powers of the office are nowhere
71. See id. at 13-14. An analogy is the Knapp Commission's argument that the
investigation of allegations against policemen by policemen creates a crisis of public
confidence.
72. See id. at 15; Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges in New York City, New York

Magazine, Oct. 6, 1972, at 32; N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1972, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1972, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1972, at 18, col. 1.

73. N.Y. CONsT. art. VI 2(a), 6(c).
74. Note, Remedies for JudicialMisconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline
of Judges, supra note 39 at 190.

75. N.Y. CONsT. art XIII, 13.
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specified in the constitution; they must be left to history, conflicting judicial interpretations,76 and statute. 7 The state legislature
78
has mandated the duties of the office in the following language:
It shall be the duty of every district attorney to conduct all
prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of
the county for which he shall have been elected or appointed.
This duty is reinforced by several provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law whereby the district attorney is allowed to be present
during proceedings of a grand jury,79 is, along with the court,
made the legal advisor of the grand jury,"0 is allowed to choose
witnesses for the grand jury,8' and is required or authorized, depending upon the circumstances, to present evidence to a grand
82
jury.
When considered together, the statutes and case law make
the district attorney the prosecutorial and chief law enforcement
officer of the county within which his jurisdiction is confined, and
vest him with considerable discretion as to the manner in which
he exercises his powers. 3 Except in those cases where the Governor has issued a superseding order pursuant to provisions of the
Executive Law,8 4 or where specific statutory provisions vest prosecutorial powers in the Attorney General,8 ' the prosecutorial power
76. See Matter of Turecamo Contracting Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d
Dep't. 1940); Application of Cranford Material Corp., 174 Misc. 154, 20 N.Y.S.2d 865
(Sup. Ct., 1940); People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Queens County Ct.
1941); But see People v. Tru-Sport Publishing Co., 160 Misc. 628, 291 N.Y.S. 449 (Sup.
Ct. 1936). See generally, Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys In New York
City-The Constitutionalityand Legality of Executive OrderNo. 55, 41 Fordham L. Rev.,
517, 518-522 (1973).
77. N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 700(1) (McKinney 1972).
78. Id.
79. N.Y. CasRM. PRO. LAW § 190.25(3)(a) (McKinney 1971).
80. N.Y. CruM. PRo. LAW § 190.25(6) (McKinney 1971).
81. N.Y. CaMi. PRo. LAW § 190.50(2) (McKinney 1971).
82. N.Y. CuIM. PRo. LAW § 190.55(2) (McKinney 1971).
83. See Johnson v. Boldman, 24 Misc.2d 592, 203 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
McDonald v. Goldstein, 191 Misc. 863, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1948) and Application
of Coleman, 1 Misc.2d 685, 148 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1956), as to the discretionary power
of the district attorney.
84. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 1972). See People v. Hopkins, 182 Misc. 313,
47 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1944); Application of Cranford Material Corp., 174 Misc.
154, 20 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1940); People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637
(Queens County Ct., 1941).
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Exzc. LAw §§ 63(10), 63(13), 70,70-a (McKinney 1972); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 et seq. (McKinney 1968); N.Y. TAx LAw, § 1 et seq. (McKinney
1966); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6512 et seq. (McKinney 1972).
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of the district attorney, within the county in which he is elected,
is exclusive. This exclusivity creates an almost insurmountable
obstacle under existing law, absent gubernatorial intervention, to
the investigation and prosecution of corruption when the district
attorney or one of his favored assistants is the subject of suspicion
or complaint.
To be sure, a corrupt district attorney will not prosecute
himself, and no one else in the county is empowered to conduct
such a prosecution unless the Governor so orders. Obviously, it
would be very embarrassing for a district attorney to have to
prosecute or investigate the conduct of his assistants, especially
since their appointment and removal are at his discretion and
pleasure.86 The situation with respect to investigation and prosecution of district attorneys and their assistants is further complicated by the fact that as elected officials, district attorneys owe
deference to their party's local political leaders who would certainly look with disfavor on public notoriety.
Nevertheless, some control mechanisms exist under current
constitutional and statutory provisions which allow for investigations of and proceedings against district attorneys for their misconduct. The New York State Constitution contains two provisions, one permissive 7 and the other mandatory," which the
Governor may invoke to remove a district attorney from his office.
Section 13(a) of Article XIII grants the Governor power to remove
a district attorney within his term, but requires that before removal the district attorney be given a copy of the charges against
him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense. Section 13(b)
of Article XIII requires the Governor, after due notice and an
opportunity to be heard, to take such action against district attorneys for failure to prosecute violations by public officers:8"
Any district attorney who shall fail faithfully to prosecute a
person charged with the violation in his county of any provision
of this article which may come to his knowledge, shall be removed from office by the governor. ...
The constitution further directs the legislature to make provisions "by law for the removal for misconduct or malversation
in office of all officers, except judicial, whose powers and duties
86. N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 702 (McKinney 1972).
87. N.Y. CONsT. art. XfII, § 13(a).
88. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(b).

89. Id.
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are not local or legislative and who shall be elected at general
elections. .

. ."I'

Since the district attorney is an officer who,

under provisions of the County Law, is elected at general elections and has powers and duties which are neither local nor legislative,"1 he is subject to the removal procedures established by the
legislature.
The legislature has established procedures for gubernatorial
removal of public officers in the Public Officers Law. Under the
statutory procedures, the Governor himself may conduct an investigation of charges and take evidence at a hearing to determine
their truth, or he may direct that the investigation or hearing, or
both, be conducted by a Supreme Court justice or County judge,
or by a commissioner. The Governor is further empowered to
direct the Attorney General or a district attorney to assist in
conducting the investigation or hearing, and if neither are so
directed, the Governor or his designee may employ counsel and
other necessary personnel. The Governor may further direct his
designee to report to him the evidence and the material facts
deemed by the designee to be established. The officer accused
and his counsel have the right to be present at the hearing. They
may be present during the investigation if invited. All evidence
which is in any report to the Governor or is used as a basis of
determination must be presented at the hearing. These procedures were established for exercise of the Governor's removal
powers and they provide one mechanism to investigate the conduct of a district attorney and to discipline misconduct or mal2
feasance in office.1

Another mechanism for investigating a district attorney's
conduct is provided by the Criminal Procedure Law. One of the
functions of the grand jury under this statute is to hear and examine evidence concerning misconduct, nonfeasance and neglect in
public office, whether criminal3 or otherwise, and to take action
with respect to such evidence.1

One course of action the grand jury may follow is the filing
of a report "[c]oncerning misconduct, nonfeasance or neglect in
public office by a public servant as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action ... ,,9In theory of course,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.
N.Y.

art. XIII, § 5.
CouNTY LAW §§ 400, 700 et seq. (McKinney 1972).
PuB. OFFicERs L4,w § 34 (McKinney 1952).
CRaM. PRo. LAW §§ 190.06 and 190.05 (McKinney 1971).
CPmr. PRo. LAW § 190.85 (1)(a) (McKinney 1971).
CONST.
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the grand jury itself could conduct an investigation into charges
of misconduct against a district attorney by using its power to call
witnesses, 5 and utilizing the court as its legal advisor. However,
it is almost inconceivable that a grand jury, absent a superseder
order by the Governor," could successfully conduct such an investigation because of the normally close working relationship between it and the district attorney." In addition, the absence of its
own professional staff makes the grand jury a poorly outfitted
investigatory body.
The Attorney General could also undertake investigation and
prosecution of misconduct by a district attorney,99 if the Governor
issues an Executive Order superseding the district attorney's
local prosecutorial power. Upon approval and direction of the
Governor, the Attorney General might also conduct such an investigation while inquiring into "matters concerning the public
peace, public safety and public justice."'' 0
The Temporary Commission of Investigation, popularly
known as the State Investigation Commission, is granted power
to conduct investigations into the "faithful execution and effective enforcement" of laws, "the conduct of public officers," and
"[a]ny matter concerning the public peace, public safety and
public justice."'' Upon request of the Governor the Commission
is required to conduct investigations and otherwise assist him in
connection with the removal of public officers, and the Commission is mandated, when it finds cause for criminal prosecution or
removal of a public officer for misconduct, to refer the evidence
to the appropriate prosecuting officials. 02 The Commission, however, even with its broad investigatory powers, does not fill the
void. In short, New York simply lacks any statewide agency or
official with power both to investigate and prosecute corrupt officials within the criminal justice system without having to go to
other outside officers or agencies for assistance.
A district attorney is further subject to investigation and
discipline by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.0 3 The
95. N.Y. CrIM. PRo. LAw § 190.50(3) (McKinney 1971).
96. N.Y. CRna. PRo. LAW § 190.25(6)(McKinney 1971).
97. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(2) (McKinney 1972).
98. See N.Y. CaM. PRo. LAw § 190 et seq. (McKinney 1971).
99. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(2) (McKinney 1972).
100. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(8) (McKinney 1972).
101. The Commission was created pursuant to Unconsolidated Laws § 7501, et seq.,
Ch. 898 of the Laws of 1958, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 7501 et seq. (McKinney 1961).
102. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7502 (McKinney 1961).
103. N.Y. JuDicIARy LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
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Appellate Division is granted powers to "censure, suspend from
practice or remove from office any attorney . . . who is guilty of
professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or
misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice . ... 104 The justices of the Appellate Division may require another district attorney within the judicial department to
prosecute the proceedings, or they may appoint any attorney to
conduct the preliminary investigation and prosecution. Other
statutory provisions give the accused a right to be heard, require
the proceedings to be confidential unless charges are sustained,
any Appellate Division final
and grant a right of appeal from
10 5
order to the Court of Appeals.
Though the legislature has granted the Appellate Division
broad powers of discipline extending to the removal of attorneys,
including district attorneys, the structure is inadequate to be an
effective method of investigating corruption in a district attorney's office. This is so because the.Appellate Division's disciplinary powers are complaint oriented. Here too, there is no permanent staff of experienced investigators capable of initiating or
conducting an on-going investigation and a possibly complicated
prosecution. Here too, because both the justices and the district
attorneys are elected officials, there may not be sufficient institutional insulation between them to ensure unfettered investigation
and prosecution.
In summary, despite the existence in New York State of several methods to investigate the conduct of a district attorney, and
to take action for misconduct or malfeasance in office, there remain considerable inadequacies in the overall structure. First,
complaints may be received and investigations undertaken by a
multitude of officers or bodies, each with its own procedures for
dealing with complaints. The processing of the complaints or
allegations very much depends not on which particular body is
best suited for this task, but rather on the fortuitous location to
which the complainant initially brings the complaint. Second,
there exists no office or agency with a permanent staff for undertaking both investigations and prosecutions of suspected miscreant district attorneys, absent affirmative intervention by the
Governor. Third, the degree of confidentiality of any investigation is largely dependent on the particular structure which receives a complaint, and the statutes governing that structure.
Fourth, without gubernatorial intervention by way of superseding
104. Id.
105. N.Y. JuDiciRY LAW § 90 (McKinney 1968).
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a district attorney, it is almost impossible to prosecute a district
attorney for misconduct or malfeasance. Finally, the agencies and
officers currently empowered to examine and take action based
on a district attorney's conduct in office may not have sufficient
institutional insulation from partisan considerations.
C.

CorruptionBy Attorneys

Recently, there have been numerous accusations of corruption against lawyers by both the Knapp Commission and bar
associations." 6 However, district attorneys, due to the considerable work pressures on their offices, generally are loathe or unable
to commit the investigatory or legal manpower necessary to properly dispose of complicated complaints made against attorneys.
Attorneys, like any other private citizens, are subject to the
ordinary criminal processes of the State for their corrupt acts or
omissions. In addition, attorneys are subject to the power and
control of the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, which
may investigate or cause to be investigated their conduct, and
may take appropriate action based on its findings." 7
The Appellate Divisions' supervisory powers extend to taking
action against any attorney who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crimes or misdemeanors, or any
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.' The Appellate Division justices may designate a district attorney to prosecute the proceedings or appoint any attorney to conduct a preliminary investigation and prosecute any disciplinary proceedings."0 '
Two other mechanisms may be used to investigate attorneys'
conduct. The suspected corrupt conduct of any attorney may be
investigated by the State Investigation Commission in connection with "any matter concerning. . . public justice","' and
where it appears to the Commission that there is cause for prosecution, it is required to refer the evidence to the appropriate
prosecutor."' Similarly, the Attorney General, with the approval
and direction of the Governor, may look into the conduct of attorneys when inquiring into matters concerning public justice."'
106. See COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION, SUMMARY,
supra note 31 at 15; See also Kiley, ABA's Delegates SupportProbe of Watergate Lawyers,
170 N.Y.L.J. 28, August 9, 1973, at 1.
107. N.Y. JuicuRy LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
108. Id.
109. N.Y. JuDiCIRY LAw § 90(7) (McKinney 1968).
110. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7502(1) (McKinney 1961).
111. Id.
112. N.Y. ExEc LAW § 63(8) (McKinney 1972).
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In summary, there exists under the laws of New York means
adequate to the task of investigating and prosecuting attorneys
suspected of corrupt activities. They are, however, rarely used;
hence, they are ineffective as a structural deterrent to misconduct
among members of the bar. Given a Special State Prosecutor's
Office, however, with jurisdiction limited to corruption-related
offenses, and with a permanent investigative and prosecutorial
staff, this situation could be changed.
D. Police Corruption
The Knapp Commission found police corruption to be widespread throughout New York City.' The Commission found that
a basic weakness in approaches dealing with this problem is that
"all agencies regularly involved with the problem rely primarily
on policemen to do their investigative work.""' This criticism was
leveled at the Police Department's internal structures, the district attorneys in the five counties, and the Department of Investigation. The Commission further found with respect to the district attorneys that "there is the additional problem that they
work so closely with policemen that the public tends to look upon
them-and indeed they seem to look upon themselves-as allies
of the Department" 1 5 creating a general public distrust of the
way in which allegations against police are handled. It was this
public distrust of having policemen investigate policemen, and of
the efficacy of making complaints against policemen to the district attorneys that led the Knapp Commission to recommend
that the Governor, acting with the Attorney General, appoint a
Special State Prosecutor.
While it is true that law enforcement officers are subject to
the ordinary criminal processes, including prosecution by the district attorney of the county in which their alleged misconduct or
malfeasance occurs, the Knapp Commission, in an attempt to
determine how effectively those processes were being used, studied the activity of the five district attorneys in New York City in
prosecuting and disposing of police corruption cases."' When one
compares the widespread corruption which the Commission
113.

COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION, SUMMARY,

supra

note 31 at 1-3.

114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 14.
116. COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION INTHE CITY OF
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 37 at 249-253 (1972).

NEW YORK,
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found existent with the activity of the district attorneys and the
relatively mild punishments imposed by the courts upon convicted police officers, the effectiveness of existing criminal processes in rooting out police corruption, and bringing corrupt police to justice is certainly left open to question.
There may be many explanations for this phenomenon, some
of which are: the reliance on police to investigate police, a sympathetic outlook of district attorneys toward police, the difficulties
of committing time and manpower to long-range or on-going investigations, the case-oriented approach of the district attorneys,
problems related to investigative techniques, jurisdictional limitations, or a combination of these factors. Whatever the reason,
the Commission was led to recommend that an independent prosecutor, capable of being wholly independent of other law enforcement agencies, with all his efforts being devoted to combating
corruption, and with a more extensive geographical jurisdiction,
would be better suited to deal with corruption in law enforcement
than would the local district attorneys. "7
Statutes grant several other agencies or officers besides the
district attorney's office powers to investigate corruption in law
enforcement. Grand juries may investigate police corruption
under their authority to hear and examine evidence "concerning
the alleged commission of any offense prosecutable in the courts
of the county, and concerning any misconduct, nonfeasance or
neglect in public office by a public servant, whether criminal or
otherwise."' The State Investigation Commission, by statutory
mandate, has the statewide duty and power to investigate corruption in law enforcement while inquiring into the faithful execution and effective enforcement of law, the conduct of public officers and employees, and public justice."' Although it lacks prosecutive, quasi-judicial, or administrative functions, the State
Commission has frequently exercised its investigatory powers in
the area of police corruption."' The Attorney General, by gubernatorial direction and approval, may be ordered to investigate, or
investigate and prosecute, charges relative to the administration
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 255-258, 15-61.
N.Y. CruM. PRO. LAW § 190.55 (1) (McKinney 1971).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7502 (McKinney 1961).
See TEMPORARY COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FourTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT at 73-77, 122-207 (1972); ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1969); NINTH
ANNuAL REPORT (1967); THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1961).
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and enforcement of law.' 2' The Deputy Attorney General in

charge of the statewide Organized Crime Task Force may investigate, or in certain circumstances investigate and prosecute, corruption in law enforcement when organized crime activity is involved, and is carried on either between two or more counties, or
between this State and another jurisdiction.'22 Lastly, the Gover-

nor may investigate law enforcement corruption pursuant to the
exercise of his power to remove, on charges, the chief or commissioner of the police force of any of the sixty-two cities of the
State.E2
A superficial glance might make it appear that there exists
adequate overlapping statutory structures to ensure the necessary
investigation and prosecution of corrupt law enforcement officials. These structures, however, have not proven to be sufficiently effective. Indeed, if these were performing satisfactorily,
there would not have been recent official public criticism by the
24
State Investigation Commission' and the Knapp Commission,'2
2
6
or journalistic criticism, concerning the way corruption cases
involving law enforcement officers are processed through and disposed of by the criminal justice system.
Moreover, had the situation been otherwise, it is unlikely the
Governor would have felt it necessary to take two extraordinary
steps: one directing the Attorney General to appoint a Special
Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute corruption throughout
the criminal justice system of New York City; and the other,
ordering the State Commission of Investigation to establish a
New York City unit to monitor, evaluate and make recommendations as to the conduct of elected and appointed public officials
entrusted with the enforcement of the laws and the administration of justice in New York City.'2
121.
122.
123.
1952).
124.

N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 63(2), 63(8) (McKinney 1972).
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 70-a (McKinney 1972).
N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW § 33(2) (McKinney 1972) and § 34 (McKinney
See TEMPORARY COMUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FOUR120 at 158-190.

TEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

125. See COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION, COMUSSION

supra note 37 at 249-253, 255-258.
126. See Pileggi and Pearl, What Happens When Cops Get Caught, New York Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 3, at 23-29 (July 23, 1973).
127. See Statement by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Special Prosecutor/N.Y.C.)
(Sept. 19, 1972), supra note 33.
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CONCLUSION

The preceding examination of the structures and means
which exist under New York State law to deal with the problems
of corruption in the criminal justice system leads to the inescapable conclusion that current methods allow for confused, disjointed, and duplicitous efforts with action very much dependent
upon the way or ways in which complaints are received, and by
whom they are received. For purposes of both investigation and
prosecution, as distinct from investigation alone, the structures
do not permit any well-planned, multi-county, or statewide, comprehensive attack on the problem without extraordinary intervention by the Governor or action by the state legislature.
Even if the Governor were willing to take such extraordinary
actions, as he has done with the Executive Orders creating the
Office of the Special State Prosecutor, it is unlikely that he would
be willing to supersede the district attorneys in all sixty-two
counties of the State as to some particular subject matter jurisdiction, however limited.' 8 In 1945, Governor Dewey's counsel
explained the standard required before invocation of a superseder: "action displacing a local official, particularly an elected
one, by a State representative is not to be resorted to unless there
is compelling evidence that the existing agencies are not performing or are incapable of performing their proper functions."' 9 If the
Governor were convinced that existing statewide agencies are
incapable of performing their proper functions with respect to
official corruption, it is preferable that the appropriate corrective
action should be legislative rather than executive.
Previous efforts in attacking corruption in government and
administration of criminal justice have been tradition-bound,
inefficient, and entirely fragmented. Existing institutions are inadequate to resolve this recurring problem. Recognizing the
shortcomings of current structures and means for dealing with
corruption, coupled with the extent of corruption already exposed
and suspected, the need for an Office of the Special State Prosecutor cannot be considered ephemeral, whether its jurisdiction is
128. It is to be noted that Governor Harriman denied a request to appoint a statewide
special prosecutor on the grounds it would amount to superseding the district attorneys
in all sixty-two counties without sufficient basis. See 1957 Public Papers of Governor
Harriman 1139.
129. Pitler, Superseding The DistrictAttorneys In New York City - The Constitutionality and Legality of Executive OrderNo. 55, supra note 76 at 526, citing 1945 Public
Paper of Governor Dewey 369.
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limited to New York City as is presently the case, or its geographic horizons are expanded. Indeed, such an Office would certainly be strengthened if institutionalized by statute as was accomplished with the Organized Crime Task Force, 130 and as was
introduced for the Office of the Special State Prosecutor by
amendment to Section 70a of the Executive Law during the 1973
3
legislative session.' 1
The Office would gain strength for numerous reasons:
First, the Office would become a permanent, perpetual
agency whose life was not dependent solely upon the Governor's
mandate. 132
Second, the Office would become a statewide agency with
jurisdiction in all sixty-two counties, adding to its stature.
Third, statutory existence would resolve jurisdictional challenges to the Office.
Fourth, a permanent statewide agency would have superior
personnel recruitment and career development capabilities.
Fifth, a statutory agency would have a greater public acceptance, would be more widely known, and would encourage increased public confidence.
Sixth, the existence of a permanent statutory agency with
jurisdiction specifically directed to rooting out official corruption
would serve as a greater deterrent to corrupt activity.
Seventh, a statutory agency would be better able to initiate
and execute a well planned, comprehensive, and long-range attack on corruption.
Eighth, a statutory agency would make available this intensive law enforcement effort to all the people of the State, and not
to New York City alone.
Ninth, a statutory agency would be able to better complement the activities of existing agencies and officers such as the
State Investigation Commission, local prosecutors, and federal
prosecutors.
The Office of Special State Prosecutor does have a vital and
important role to play in New York State. Aside from its more
publicized case by case functions of receiving and investigating
complaints, bringing offenders to justice, and exonerating the
130.
131.
132.
nate the

N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 70-a (McKinney 1972).
N.Y. Senate Bill 5860-A (1973-1974 Regular Sessions) (March 13, 1973).
See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(2). Under existing statutes the Governor could termiOffice of Special Prosecutor by finding it no longer required.
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innocent, the Office can accomplish other equally, if not more
important, objectives. It can help restore public confidence in the
administration of justice and in government. The Office can
make positive recommendations for reforms in existing institutions; court reforms, law reforms, reforms in judicial selections,
reforms in the administration of justice, reforms in law enforcement, and, reforms in the corrections system. Moreover, the Office can help create a public awareness of needed changes in laws
and in the organization, policies, and procedures of all agencies
responsible for the administration of justice. These changes are
necessary if the agencies are to deal effectively with crime. Examination of substantive laws must be undertaken to determine
whether in some instances, because they are unenforceable or
arbitrary, may contribute more to corruption than to protection
of the public. With a permanent professional staff the Office can
be of invaluable assistance in this area. Most important, the Office can help assure the people of the State that they have an
incorruptible system of criminal justice. In the words of Governor
Rockefeller this is fundamental to our society:'33
Thus an incorruptible system of criminal justice is basic to any
hope of effectively coping with rising levels of crime.
Beyond this, an incorruptible system of criminal justice is essential to incorruptible government at all levels and to the confidence of the people in their government at all levels.
133. Transcript of Press Conference, supra note 33, at 5.
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APPENDIX A
Executive Order No. 55:
THE HONORABLE LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK
STATE CAPITOL
ALBANY, NEW YORK
TO:

I. Pursuant to article IV section three of the Constitution
of the State of New York, the provisions of subdivision two of
section 63 of the Executive Law and the statutes and law in such
case made and provided, and in view of the recommendation of
the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption in
the City of New York, I hereby require that you, the Attorney
General of this State, attend in person, or by one or more of your
assistants or deputies, an Extraordinary Special and Trial Term
of the Supreme Court to be appointed by me to be held in and
for the county of New York at the County Court House and any
other term or terms of the Supreme Court in and for the County
of New York, and that you, in person or by said assistants or
deputies, appear before the grand jury drawn for said extraordinary term of said court, and before any grand jury or grand juries
which shall be drawn or which shall have heretofore been drawn
for any other term or terms of said court, for the purpose of
managing and conducting in said court and before said grand jury
and said other grand juries any and all proceedings, examinations
and inquiries and any and all criminal actions and proceedings
which may be had or taken by or before said grand jury and grand
juries concerning or relating to:
(a) any and all corrupt acts and omissions by a public servant or former public servant occurring heretofore or hereafter in
the County of New York in violation of any provision of State
or local law and arising out of, relating to or in any way connected with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in the City of New York;
(b) any and all acts and omissions and alleged acts and
omissions by any person occurring heretofore or hereafter in the
County of New York in violation of any provision of State or
local law and arising out of, relating to or in any way connected
with corrupt acts or omissions by a public servant or former
public servant arising out of, relating to or in any way connected
with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in the City of New York;
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(c) without limiting the foregoing provisions, any and all
acts and omissions and alleged acts and omissions by any person
occurring heretofore or hereafter in the County of New York in
violation of any provision of State or local law and arising out
of, relating to or in any way connected with the receipt, possession, or disposal of dangerous drugs by the Police Department
of the City of New York, its officers, employees, or agents;*
(d) any and all acts and omissions and alleged acts and
omissions occurring heretofore or hereafter to obstruct, hinder
or interfere with any inquiry, prosecution, trial or judgment
pursuant to or connected with this requirement;
and that you conduct, manage, prosecute and handle such other
proper actions and proceedings relating thereto as may come before said court and that you conduct, manage, prosecute and
handle all trials at said extraordinary term of court or at any term
of said court at which any and all indictments which may be
found and which may hereafter be tried, pursuant to or in connection with this requirement, and in the event of any appeal or
appeals or other proceedings connected therewith, to manage,
prosecute, conduct and handle the same; and that in person or
by your assistants or deputies you, as of the date hereof, supersede and in the place and stead of the District Attorney of the
County of New York exercise all the powers and perform all the
duties conferred upon you by the statutes and law in such case
made and provided and this requirement made hereunder; and
that in such proceedings and actions the District Attorney of the
County of New York shall exercise only such powers and perform
such duties as are required of him by you or your assistants or
deputies so attending.
II. Pursuant to subdivision 8 of section 63 of the Executive
Law, I also find it to be in the public interest to require that you
inquire into matters concerning the public peace, public safety
and public justice with respect to the subjects which are within
the scope of this requirement, and I so direct you to do so in
person or by your assistant or deputies and to have the powers
and duties specified in such subdivision 8 for the purposes of this
requirement.
III. For purposes of this requirement the following terms
have the following meanings:
(a) "Person" means a human being, and where appropriate,
a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association,
a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.
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(b) "Public servant" means (a) any public officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision thereof or of any
governmental instrumentality within the state, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee. The term public servant includes a person who has been
elected or designated to become a public servant.
(c) "Corrupt acts and omissions" includes, but is not limited to:
(1) any act or alleged act by a public servant relating
to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of
his official functions;
(2) any failure or alleged failure by a public servant to
perform a duty which is imposed upon him by State or
local law or administrative rule or regulation or is clearly
inherent in the nature of his office;
(3) any and all acts or omissions or alleged acts or
omissions constituting a violation of the following sections
or of the sections within the following articles of the Penal
Law:
(i) Sections 135.60 and 135.65 (Coercion)
(ii) Article 155 (Larceny)
(iii) Sections 195.00 (Official Misconduct) and
195.05 (Obstructing governmental administration)
(iv) Article 200 (Bribery involving public servants
and related offenses)
(v) Article 210 (Perjury and related offenses)
(vi) Article 215 (Other offenses relating to judicial
and other proceedings);
(4) any and all acts or omissions or alleged acts or
omissions constituting a violation of Penal Law articles 100
(Criminal Solicitation), 105 (Conspiracy), 110 (Attempt),
and 115 (Criminal Facilitation) with respect to offenses
defined in paragraph (3);
(5) any and all other offenses that may be properly
joined with offenses defined in paragraphs (3) and (4);
IV. This requirement shall not apply to the management and
conduct of the prosecution of any indictment filed in said court
on or before the date of this requirement.
Signed: Nelson A. Rockefeller
Dated: September 19, 1972
*

Ed. Note: Paragraph (c) was added to the original Order by

Executive Order No. 55.03 of December 28, 1972.
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APPENDIX B
Executive Order No. 61:
TO: THE HONORABLE LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK
STATE CAPITOL
ALBANY, NEW YORK
WHEREAS, in my opinion, the public interest requires it:
I. NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with Article VI Section 27 of the Constitution, statute and law in such case made and
provided, I do hereby appoint an Extraordinary Special and Trial
Term of the Supreme Court to be held at the New York County
Criminal Court Building, 100 Centre Street, in the County of New
York on the seventeenth day of October nineteen hundred
seventy-two, at ten o'clock in the forenoon of that day and to
continue for so long as it may be necessary for the purpose of any
criminal, civil or other judicial action or proceeding which may
be attended by the Attorney General or by one or more of his
deputies or assistants and which may be held, conducted or given
threat concerning or relating to the subjects within the scope of
my executive order and requirement to the Attorney General,
numbered fifty-five and dated September nineteen, nineteen
hundred seventy-two, and all amendments thereto heretofore or
hereafter promulgated, and for the purpose of conducting and
handling such other proper acts, procedures, and matters relating
thereto as may come before the court.
II. I do hereby designate the Honorable John M. Murtagh, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First
Judicial District, to hold the said Extraordinary Special and Trial
Term as hereinbefore appointed and described and among other
things to cause to be drawn according to law a grand jury or grand
juries to serve the said Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of
the Supreme Court.
III. I do further direct that copies of the notice of the appointment and the designation hereinabove made and provided
for shall be released and distributed to the general press.
Signed: Nelson A. Rockefeller
Dated: October 13, 1972
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